Abstract
The classic unitary model assumes that households maximize a household utility function and implies resource ‘pooling’ – household behaviour does not depend on individuals’ control over resources within the household. Since the 1980s, economists have modified the unitary model in ways that have theoretical, empirical and practical implications. Non-unitary alternatives based on joint decision-making by individual family members with distinct preferences broaden the range of observable behaviour consistent with economic rationality. Many non-unitary models imply that both individuals’ control over resources and ‘environmental factors’ can affect intra-household allocation. Empirical evidence has consistently rejected income pooling and, hence, the unitary model.
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Lundberg, S., Pollak, R.A. (2018). Family Decision Making. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2551
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2551
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