Robert W. Rosenthal (1944–2002) was an economic theorist whose thoughtful papers inspired a wide range of new ideas. As Radner and Ray (2003) point out, Rosenthal (1978) gives one of the first formal statements of the revelation principle, a result noted in Myerson’s first paper (1979) on the subject. Rosenthal (1979) initiated the study of repeated games with varying opponents, a modelling device used by Milgrom et al. (1990), Kandori (1992), and others to study social norms and other issues. He also wrote influential papers on pricing (Rosenthal 1980, 1982), multi-unit auctions (Krishna and Rosenthal 1996), purification of mixed strategy equilibria (Radner and Rosenthal 1982; Aumann et al. 1983), sovereign debt (Fernandez and Rosenthal 1990), analysis of experimental data (Brown and Rosenthal 1990), and many other topics.
Backward induction Centipede game Iterated dominance Mixed strategy equilibria Multi-unit auctions Quantal response equilibrium Rationality Repeated games Revelation principle Rosenthal, R. W. Social norms Sovereign debt
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