The theory of fair division is concerned with the design of procedures for allocating a bundle of goods among n persons who are perceived to have equal rights to the goods. Both equity (according to criteria discussed below) and efficiency are sought. The theory is of interest primarily because its approach to allocation problems enjoys some important advantages over the alternative approach suggested by neoclassical welfare economics, and because studying the sense in which procedures actually in use are equitable is a good way to learn about popular notions of equity.
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