This article is a brief survey on the Nash program for coalitional games. Results of non-cooperative implementation of the Nash solution, the Shapley value and the core are discussed.
KeywordsCooperative games Core Edgeworth, F. Nash program Nash solution Non-cooperative games Shapley value Subgame perfect equilibrium Walrasian outcome
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