The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Endogenous Market Incompleteness

  • Christopher Sleet
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2385

Abstract

Endogenously incomplete models derive restrictions on asset trading from primitive constraints on the enforcement and monitoring technologies available to societies. They have been applied to a wide variety of macroeconomic problems. This article reviews some of these applications and the models that underpin them.

Keywords

Asset pricing models Autarky Bilateral insurance games Commitment Default Dynamic moral hazard models Endogenously incomplete markets Equity premium Euler equations Incomplete markets Information revelation Limited enforcement models Risk sharing Taxation of assets 

JEL Classifications

D4 D10 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christopher Sleet
    • 1
  1. 1.