The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Policy Reform, Political Economy of

  • Sharun W. Mukand
Reference work entry


Policymakers face political constraints that make enacting reform difficult. Since the late 1980s economists have developed a framework to analyse the deeper political underpinnings of policy inefficiency. This article develops a framework for delineating the key findings of this literature. It then briefly sketches out the role of institutions in facilitating policy reform.


Adjustment costs Commitment Compensation Democracy Distributional conflict Government failure Institutional design New political economy Policy persistence Policy reform Public choice Rational choice political economy Rent seeking Reputation Stabilization policy Time inconsistency 

JEL Classifications

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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sharun W. Mukand
    • 1
  1. 1.