The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Science, Economics of

  • Arthur M. DiamondJr.
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2350

Abstract

The importance of the economics of science is substantially due to the importance of science as a driver of technology, and technology as a driver of productivity and growth. Believing that science matters, economists have attempted to understand the behaviour of scientists and the operation of scientific institutions. One goal is to see how far science can be understood as a market, and how far the market for science and scientists can be understood as efficient. When inefficiency is found, a related goal is to propose changes in resource levels or incentives, to increase the speed of scientific advance.

Keywords

Academic tenure Arrow, K. Babbage, C. Becker, G. Cobweb model Compensating differentials Crowding out Economic growth Friedman, M. Griliches, Z. Human capital Implicit contracts Life-cycle investment models Matthew effect Merton, R. Mobility Mokyr, J. National Science Foundation New growth theory Peirce, C. Polanyi. M. Productivity Public goods Rent seeking Research and development Research productivity Romer, P. Schumpeter, J. Science funding Science, economics of Smith, A. Social capital Stigler, G. Technology 

JEL Classifications

O3 
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© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Arthur M. DiamondJr.
    • 1
  1. 1.