The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Cournot Competition

  • Andrew F. Daughety
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2345

Abstract

Cournot’s 1838 model of strategic interaction between competing firms has become the primary workhorse for the analysis of imperfect competition, and shows up in a variety of fields, notably industrial organization and international trade. This article begins with a tour of the basic Cournot model and its properties, touching on existence, uniqueness, stability, and efficiency; this discussion especially emphasizes considerations involved in using the Cournot model in multi-stage applications. A discussion of recent applications is provided as well as a reference to an extended bibliography of approximately 125 selected publications from 2001 through 2005.

Keywords

Auctions with competition Bertrand competition Best-reply dynamics Best-response functions Complementarities Conjectural variations Cournot competition Cournot equilibrium Cournot models Cournot, A. A. Differentiated products Dynamic stability Efficiency Existence theorems Imperfect competition Information sharing among firms Licences Market power Mergers Multiple equilibria Multi-stage games Multi-stage models of competition Networks Oligopoly Patents Product differentiation Repeated games Research and development Signalling Strategic substitutes Subgame perfection Supermodular games Uniqueness Welfare 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrew F. Daughety
    • 1
  1. 1.