The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Computing in Mechanism Design

  • Tuomas Sandholm
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2327

Abstract

Computational issues are important in mechanism design, but have received insufficient research interest. This article briefly reviews some of the key ideas. I discuss computing by the centre, such as an auction server or vote aggregator, and computing by the agents, be they human or software. Limited computing hinders mechanism design in several ways, and presents deep strategic interactions between computing and incentives. On the bright side, novel algorithms and increasing computing power have enabled better mechanisms. Perhaps most interestingly, with computationally limited agents, one can implement mechanisms that would not be implementable among computationally unlimited agents.

Keywords

Algorithmic mechanism design Automated mechanism design Borda voting rule Bounded rationality Combinatorial auctions Complexity theory Computing by the centre Computing in mechanism design Deliberation equilibrium Elicitor ex post equilibrium Expressive commerce Fielded combinatorial auctions Fielded expressive auctions Gibbard–Satterthwaite th Incentive compatibility Maximin voting rule Non-truth-promoting mechanism Mechanism design Performance profile tree Plurality voting rule Preference determination Preference elicitation Pull–pushmechanism Revelation principle Strategic computing Tree search Vickrey auction Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism 

JEL Classifications

C7 
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Notes

Acknowledgment

This work was funded by the National Science Foundation under ITR grant IIS0427858, and a Sloan Foundation Fellowship. I thank Felix Brandt, Christina Fong, Joe Halpern, and David Parkes for helpful comments.

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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tuomas Sandholm
    • 1
  1. 1.