The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Justice (New Perspectives)

  • Bertil Tungodden
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2301

Abstract

This article provides a survey of recent normative work on justice. It shows how the concern for distributive equality has been questioned by the idea of personal responsibility and the idea that there is nothing intrinsically valuable in levelling down individual benefits. It also discusses the possibility of combining a concern for the worse off with a concern for Pareto efficiency, within both aggregative and nonaggregative frameworks, which includes a discussion of the arguments of prioritarianism, sufficientarianism, and welfarism. Finally, the article briefly reviews the modern literatures on rights-based reasoning, intergenerational justice and international justice.

Keywords

Altruism Behavioural economics Choice Compensation Consequentialism Difference principle Egalitarianism Equality Equalization Evolutionary economics Fair allocation Fairness Harsanyi, J. C. Independence of irrelevant alternatives Indexing impasse Infinite horizons Intergenerational justice International justice Interpersonal utility comparisons Justice Leximin Libertarianism Maximin Nozick, R. Pareto efficiency Pareto indifference Pareto principle Poverty Poverty alleviation Preferences Primary goods Prioritarianism Rawls, J. Responsibility Self-ownership Sen, A. Social welfare function Sufficiency Sufficientarianism Tyranny of aggregation Utilitarianism Veil of ignorance Welfarism Well-being 

JEL Classifications

K0 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bertil Tungodden
    • 1
  1. 1.