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Behavioural Economics and Game Theory

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Abstract

Behavioural economics, broadly defined, refers to the research programme that investigates the relationship between psychology and economic behaviour. The purpose of this article is to provide an outline of behavioural economics research and to describe where research in behavioural game theory stands within this outline. The aim is not to assess the impact of particular contributions or describe and interpret specific applications. Rather, the goal is to provide an organization of the literature based on the type of departures from standard theory.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Faruk Gul

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  1. Faruk Gul
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© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

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Gul, F. (2018). Behavioural Economics and Game Theory. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2284

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