The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Behavioural Economics and Game Theory

  • Faruk Gul
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2284

Abstract

Behavioural economics, broadly defined, refers to the research programme that investigates the relationship between psychology and economic behaviour. The purpose of this article is to provide an outline of behavioural economics research and to describe where research in behavioural game theory stands within this outline. The aim is not to assess the impact of particular contributions or describe and interpret specific applications. Rather, the goal is to provide an organization of the literature based on the type of departures from standard theory.

Keywords

Ambiguity Ambiguity aversion Asymmetric information Auctions Behavioural economics Behavioural economics and game theory Commitment Evolutionary games Expected utility hypothesis Fixed point theorems Framing effects Game theory Independence axiom Interdependent preferences Mechanism design Neuroeconomics Preference reversals Probability distributions Prospect theory Psychological games Social preferences Ultimatum game Uncertainty 

JEL Classifications

C7 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Faruk Gul
    • 1
  1. 1.