A mixed strategy is a probability distribution one uses to randomly choose among available actions in order to avoid being predictable. In a mixed strategy equilibrium each player in a game is using a mixed strategy, one that is best for him against the strategies the other players are using. In laboratory experiments the behaviour of inexperienced subjects has generally been inconsistent with the theory in important respects; data obtained from contests in professional sports conforms much more closely with the theory.
Competition Equilibrium Game theory Minimax strategy Mixed strategy equilibrium Price dispersion Pure strategy Quantal response equilibrium Reinforcement learning
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