The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Strategic Voting

  • Timothy Feddersen
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2273

Abstract

Strategic voting in elections occurs when a voter submits a ballot in an election with the intention of maximizing the likelihood of a good election outcome given his expectation of how others are voting. Strategic voting is typically contrasted with sincere voting. When election rules permit ballots that amount to a rank ordering of alternatives, a voter is said to vote sincerely if his ballot ranks more preferred alternatives above less preferred ones. There is evidence of strategic voting in real elections, and an extensive theoretical literature demonstrates incentives for strategic voting under almost all election rules.

Keywords

Approval voting Arrow’s theorem Binary agenda voting Collective choice Mechanism design Plurality voting Sincere voting Social choice Strategic voting 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Timothy Feddersen
    • 1
  1. 1.