The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Personnel Economics

  • Edward Lazear
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2254

Abstract

Personnel economics is the application of economic and mathematical approaches and econometric and statistical methods to traditional questions in human resources management. Many of the issues studied by personnel economists can be found in traditional textbooks written by organizational behaviour scholars and other human resources specialists. Economists have something new to say about these issues, however, primarily because economics provides a rigorous, and in many cases more straightforward, way to think about these human resources questions than do the more sociological and psychological approaches.

Keywords

Agency problems Human resources management Incentive theory Labour economics Personnel economics Prospect theory Risk aversion Stock options Tournament theory 
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© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Edward Lazear
    • 1
  1. 1.