The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Information Sharing Among Firms

  • Xavier Vives
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2238

Abstract

Firms may have efficiency or strategic incentives to share information about current and past behaviour or intended future conduct. This article examines those incentives and the welfare consequences from the perspective of static oligopoly and monopolistic competition models. It concludes with a review of the available evidence.

Keywords

Antitrust Bertrand competition Collusion Common values Cournot competition Disclosure Disclosure rules Hard information Independent values Information sharing among firms Misrepresentation Monopolistic competition Private values Product differentiation Soft information Trade associations 

JEL Classifications

L13 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xavier Vives
    • 1
  1. 1.