Abstract
This entry shows how the economics of property rights can be used to understand fundamental features of property law and related extra-legal institutions. It examines both the rationale for legal doctrine and the effects of legal doctrine regarding the exercise, enforcement, and transfer of rights. It also examines various property rights regimes including open access, private ownership, common property, and state property. Property law is understood as a system of societal rules designed to create incentives for people to maintain and invest in assets, which in turn leads to specialization and trade.
Keywords
- Akerlof, G.: and land markets
- Asymmetric information
- And adverse selection
- And servitudes
- Average product rule
- Coase Theorem
- Common interest communities
- Common property
- Compensation
- And investment decisions
- Contracting: costs
- Epstein, R.: and alienability of rights
- Externalities
- Common law responses
- Neighbourhood
- First possession
- Land use: servitudes
- Liability rules: vs. property rules
- Negligence: vs strict liability
- Open access property
- Paradox of compensation
- Posner, R.: and eminent domain
- Private property
- Property law: externalities
- Property rights
- Regimes
- Origins
- Alieneability
- Property rules: vs liability rules
- Public trust
- Rule of capture
- Servitudes
- And asymmetric information
- Social norms: and property rights
- State property
- Strict liability: vs negligence
- Takings: and US Constitution
- Regulatory
- Transaction costs
- And Coase Theorem
- Trespass: vs nuisance
- Zoning
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Lueck, D. (2018). Property Law, Economics and. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2225
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2225
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