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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics pp 10883–10891Cite as

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Property Law, Economics and

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Abstract

This entry shows how the economics of property rights can be used to understand fundamental features of property law and related extra-legal institutions. It examines both the rationale for legal doctrine and the effects of legal doctrine regarding the exercise, enforcement, and transfer of rights. It also examines various property rights regimes including open access, private ownership, common property, and state property. Property law is understood as a system of societal rules designed to create incentives for people to maintain and invest in assets, which in turn leads to specialization and trade.

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  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Dean Lueck

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  1. Dean Lueck
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Lueck, D. (2018). Property Law, Economics and. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2225

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