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Cooperative Equilibrium

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Abstract

The term ‘cooperative equilibria’ has been imported into economics from game theory. It refers to the equilibria of economic situations modelled by means of cooperative games and solved by appealing to an appropriate cooperative solution concept. The influence is not entirely one way, however. Many game theoretic notions (e.g. Cournot–Nash equilibrium, the Core) are formalizations of pre-existing ideas in economics.

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Mas-Colell, A. (2018). Cooperative Equilibrium. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_221

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