The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Auctions (Applications)

  • Patrick Bajari
Reference work entry


We survey some recent empirical work concerning the analysis of auctions. We begin by describing a two-step nonparametric approach for estimating bidding models that is commonly used in the applied literature. Two applications of this approach are considered: empirical work on bidding in Treasury markets, and empirical tests for collusion in auctions.


Auctions Bid rigging Cartels Collusion Conditional independence Discriminatory auctions Exchangeability First-price auctions Sealed-bid auctions Statistical decision theory Structural estimation Uniform price auctions 

JEL Classifications

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© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Patrick Bajari
    • 1
  1. 1.