The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Public Goods Experiments

  • Rachel T. A. Croson
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2159

Abstract

Economic theory often cites the existence of goods with externalities as justification for government intervention, either as taxation to fund goods with positive externalities which would otherwise be underprovided, or as regulation on goods with negative externalities which would otherwise be overprovided. A series of experiments tests these predictions of under- or over-provision. This article describes the landscape of public goods experiments, identifying similarities and differences between them and summarizing the broad findings.

Keywords

Altruism Common pool resource game Cooperation Coordination Externalities Learning Linear public goods game Other-regarding preferences Prisoner’s Dilemma Production functions Provision point mechanism Public good experiments Public goods Reciprocity Rent seeking Repeated games Self-interest Social cost Tragedy of the commons Voluntary contribution mechanism 

JEL Classifications

C9 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rachel T. A. Croson
    • 1
  1. 1.