The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Social Choice (New Developments)

  • Walter Bossert
  • John A. Weymark
Reference work entry


Since the late 1970s there has been a dramatic shift of focus in social choice theory, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains of the sort encountered in economic problems coming to the fore. This article provides an overview of some of the recent contributions to four topics in normative social choice theory in which economic modelling has played a prominent role: Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains, variable-population social choice, strategy-proof social choice, and axiomatic models of resource allocation.


Allotment problem Arrow’s theorem Average utilitarianism Axiomatic models of resource allocation Bergson–Samuelson social welfare function Classical utilitarianism Critical-level utilitarianism Decomposability Egalitarian equivalence Expected utility Fair allocation Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem Impossibility theorem Independence of irrelevant alternatives Interpersonal utility comparisons Majority rule Monotonicity Nondictatorship Option set Pareto efficiency Population ethics Single-peaked preferences Social choice Social welfare function Strategy-proofness Uniform rule Utilitarianism Walrasian equilibrium Welfarism 

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© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Walter Bossert
    • 1
  • John A. Weymark
    • 1
  1. 1.