Cartels are associations of firms that restrict output or set prices. They may divide markets geographically, allocate customers, rig bids at auctions, or restrict non-price terms. They have often been formed with the participation or support of state actors. In contrast to the pre-Second World War period, today most cartels are illegal in most jurisdictions. The average duration of cartels is between five and 7 years, but the distribution of duration is skewed: a large number of cartels break down within a year but a sizable proportion last for over a decade.
KeywordsAntitrust enforcement Barriers to entry Cartels Cheating Collusion Communication Concentration Coordination Entry Innovation Price fixing Price wars Productivity growth Trust
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