The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd


  • David D. Friedman
Reference work entry


Libertarians favour coordination by voluntary decentralized mechanisms such as private property and trade. In response to economic arguments for government intervention in the market, they point to the existence in the real world of private solutions to many problems of market failure and the ubiquity of market failure in political markets. Libertarians differ among themselves in the degree to which they rely on rights-based or consequentialist arguments and on how far they take their conclusions, ranging from classical liberals, who wish only to drastically reduce government, to anarcho-capitalists who would replace all useful government functions with private alternatives.


Anarchism Anarcho-capitalism Antitrust Arrow, K. Bork, R. Coase, R. Consequentialism Democracy Depletable resources Efficiency Externalities First efficiency theorem Flat tax Food and Drug Administration (USA) Free trade Friedman, M. George, H. Harsanyi, J. Higher education Hotelling, H. Human capital Immigration Imperfect competition Intellectual property Land tax Laissez-faire Left libertarianism Libertarianism Liberty Limited liability Lobbying Locke, J. Market failure Negative income tax Nozick, R. Objectivism Paternalism Positive and negative rights Pressure groups Professional licensing Property rights Public choice Public enforcement of law Public goods Rand, A. Rational ignorance Redistribution of income and wealth Rent seeking Rights Rothbard, M. Schooling Status Tariffs Tiebout, C. Utilitarianism Victimless crimes Welfare state 

JEL Classifications

This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.


  1. Arrow, K. 1983. An extension of the basic theorems of classical welfare economics. In Collected papers of Kenneth J. Arrow, volume 2: General equilibrium. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.Google Scholar
  2. Berlin, I. 1969. Four essays on liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Boaz, D. 1997. Libertarianism: A primer. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
  4. Boaz, D. 1998. The libertarian reader: Classic and contemporary writings from Lao Tzu to Milton Friedman. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
  5. Bork, R. 1971. Neutral principles and some First Amendment problems. Indiana Law Journal 47: 1–35.Google Scholar
  6. Brody, B. 1983. Redistribution without egalitarianism. Social Philosophy and Policy 1: 71–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Cheung, S. 1973. The fable of the bees: An economic investigation. Journal of Law and Economics 16: 11–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Coase, R. 1960. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Davies, S. 2002. The private provision of police during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In The voluntary city: Choice, community, and civil society, ed. D. Beito, P. Gordon, and A. Tabarrok. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
  10. Den Uyl, D., and D. Rasmussen. 1991. Liberty and nature. Chicago: Open Court.Google Scholar
  11. Ellickson, R. 1991. Order without law: How neighbors settle disputes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Theory, evidence and examples of FDA harm. Online. Accessed 2 Aug 2006.
  13. Frank, R. 1986. Choosing the right pond: Human behavior and the quest for status. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  14. Friedman, M. 1962. Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  15. Friedman, D. 1971. Laissez-faire in population: The least bad solution. Occasional paper, Population Council. Online. Accessed 3 Aug 2006.
  16. Friedman, D. 1973. The machinery of freedom: Guide to a radical capitalism, 1989. Chicago: Open Court.Google Scholar
  17. Friedman, D. 1983. Comment on Brody ‘redistribution without egalitarianism’. Social Philosophy and Policy 1: 88–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Friedman, D. 1989. The machinery of freedom: Guide to a radical capitalism. Chicago: Open Court.Google Scholar
  19. Friedman, D. 1995. Making sense of English law enforcement in the eighteenth century. University of Chicago Law School Roundtable 2(2): 475–505.Google Scholar
  20. Friedman, D. 1997. Hidden order: The economics of everyday life. New York: Collins.Google Scholar
  21. Friedman, D. 2000. Law’s order: What economics has to Do with law and why it matters. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  22. George, H. 1879. Progress and poverty, 2003. New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation.Google Scholar
  23. Gieringer, D. 1985. The safety and efficacy of new drug approval. Cato Journal 5(1): 177–201.Google Scholar
  24. Gwartney, J., and R. Stroup. 1986. Transfers, equality, and the limits of public policy. Cato Journal 6(1): 111–137.Google Scholar
  25. Harsanyi, J. 1955. Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility. Journal of Political Economy 64: 309–321.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Hotelling, H. 1931. The economics of exhaustible resources. Journal of Political Economy 39: 137–175.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Kealey, T. 1997. The economic laws of scientific research. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
  28. Kolko, G. 1977. Railroads and regulation, 1877–1916. Westport: Greenwood.Google Scholar
  29. Krueger, A. 1974. The political economy of the rent seeking society. American Economic Review 64: 291–303.Google Scholar
  30. Lester, J. 2000. Escape from leviathan: Liberty, welfare, and anarchy reconciled. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Liberty Magazine, ed. 1999. The liberty poll. Liberty Magazine, February, 11–22.Google Scholar
  32. Locke, J. 1689. Two treatises of government, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967.Google Scholar
  33. Murray, C. 2006. In our hands: A plan to replace the welfare state. Washington, DC: AEI Press.Google Scholar
  34. Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, state and Utopia. Malden: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  35. Peltzman, S. 1973. An evaluation of consumer protection legislation: The 1962 drug amendments. Journal of Political Economy 81: 1049–1091.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Posner, E. 2000. Law and social norms. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  37. Rand, A. 1964. Man’s rights. In The virtue of selfishness. New York: Signet.Google Scholar
  38. Rothbard, M. 1978. For a new liberty: The libertarian manifesto, rev. ed. Lanham: University Press of America.Google Scholar
  39. Simon, J. 1989. The economic consequences of immigration. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  40. Simon, J. 1995. Immigration: The demographic and economic facts. Washington, DC: Cato Institute. Online. Accessed 3 Aug 2006.
  41. Stigler, G. 1971. The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2: 3–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Tiebout, C. 1956. A pure theory of local public expenditures. Journal of Political Economy 64: 416–424.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Tullock, G. 1967. The welfare costs of tariffs, monopoly and theft. Western Economic Journal 5: 224–232.Google Scholar
  44. US Census Bureau. 2003. Statistical abstract of the United States. Online. Accessed 3 Aug 2006.
  45. Valentyne, P., and H. Steiner (eds.). 2000a. The origins of left libertarianism: An anthology of historical writings. New York: Palgrave.Google Scholar
  46. Valentyne, P., and H. Steiner (eds.). 2000b. Left libertarianism and its critics: The contemporary debate. New York: Palgrave.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • David D. Friedman
    • 1
  1. 1.