Libertarians favour coordination by voluntary decentralized mechanisms such as private property and trade. In response to economic arguments for government intervention in the market, they point to the existence in the real world of private solutions to many problems of market failure and the ubiquity of market failure in political markets. Libertarians differ among themselves in the degree to which they rely on rights-based or consequentialist arguments and on how far they take their conclusions, ranging from classical liberals, who wish only to drastically reduce government, to anarcho-capitalists who would replace all useful government functions with private alternatives.
KeywordsAnarchism Anarcho-capitalism Antitrust Arrow, K. Bork, R. Coase, R. Consequentialism Democracy Depletable resources Efficiency Externalities First efficiency theorem Flat tax Food and Drug Administration (USA) Free trade Friedman, M. George, H. Harsanyi, J. Higher education Hotelling, H. Human capital Immigration Imperfect competition Intellectual property Land tax Laissez-faire Left libertarianism Libertarianism Liberty Limited liability Lobbying Locke, J. Market failure Negative income tax Nozick, R. Objectivism Paternalism Positive and negative rights Pressure groups Professional licensing Property rights Public choice Public enforcement of law Public goods Rand, A. Rational ignorance Redistribution of income and wealth Rent seeking Rights Rothbard, M. Schooling Status Tariffs Tiebout, C. Utilitarianism Victimless crimes Welfare state
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