The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Nash, John Forbes (Born 1928)

  • Joel Watson
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1957

Abstract

Nash originated general non-cooperative game theory in seminal articles in the early 1950s by formally distinguishing between non-cooperative and cooperative models and by developing the concept of equilibrium for non-cooperative games. Nash developed the first bargaining solution characterized by axioms, pioneered methods and criteria for relating cooperative-theory solution concepts and non-cooperative games, and also made fundamental contributions in mathematics. Nash was the 1994 recipient of the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, jointly with John C. Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten.

Keywords

Coalitions Commitment Contract curve Cooperative games Cournot, A. A Dominance Equilibrium Equilibrium refinements Evolutionary stability Expected utility Fixed-point methods Game theory Maximin strategy Morgenstern, O Multiple equilibria Nash bargaining solution Nash demand game Nash equilibrium Nash program Nash. J. R., Jr Non-cooperative games Prisoner’s dilemma Rational behaviour Strategic and extensive-form games Strategic independence von Neumann, J 
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Notes

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Vincent Crawford, Joel Sobel and Martin Dufwenberg for comments on a preliminary draft.

Bibliography

  1. Items indicated with an asterisk provide good further background reading on John F. Nash, Jr. Also, the Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 97, issue 1 (1995), contains articles on John Nash and his co-Nobel Prize recipients, John C. Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten. For a complete list of Nash’s publications, including his papers in pure mathematics, see Milnor (1998).Google Scholar
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© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joel Watson
    • 1
  1. 1.