The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Tariff Versus Quota

  • Arvind Panagariya
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1934

Abstract

Bhagwati J. On the equivalence of tariffs and quotas. In: Baldwin RE, Bhagwati J, Caves RE, Johnson HG (eds) Trade, growth and the balance of payments: essays in honor of G. Haberler. Rand McNally, Chicago (1965) first demonstrated that if perfect competition prevails in all markets, a tariff and import quota are equivalent in the sense that an explicit tariff reproduces an import level that, if set alternatively as a quota, produces an implicit tariff equal to the explicit tariff, and vice versa. This equivalence breaks down, for example, if the domestic production is monopolized. In this case, replacing an explicit tariff by an import quota set at the level equal to the imports under the explicit leads to a higher implicit tariff. Many other cases of the breakdown of the equivalence also arise.

Keywords

Directly unproductive profit-seeking Tariff versus quota Tariffs Uncertainty Voluntary export restraints 

JEL Classifications

F1 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Arvind Panagariya
    • 1
  1. 1.