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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics pp 12481–12499Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Social Choice

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Abstract

This article is a critical survey of the literature of social choice theory, first formalized by Kenneth Arrow in 1951. Social choice theory deals with the aggregation of some measure of individual welfare into a collective measure. It takes different forms according both to what is being aggregated (interests, judgements, and so on) and to the purpose of the aggregation. The methodology of social choice has greatly clarified a range of hitherto obscure problems.

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    Amartya Sen

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Sen, A. (2018). Social Choice. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1856

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