Strategic Reallocations of Endowments
In the framework of pure exchange economies it might well happen that economic agents will find it advantageous to change their endowment holdings and by this increase their utility. Such an increase is achieved by acting competitively with the new endowments and comparing the new equilibrium allocation with the one that would have been achieved without the change.
- Gabszewicz, J.J., and J.H. Dreze. 1971. Syndicates of traders in an economy. In Differential games and related topics, ed. H.W. Kuhn and G. Szego. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar
- Hatta, T. 1983. Immiserizing growth in a many commodity setting. Working Paper, The Johns Hopkins University, September.Google Scholar
- Leontief, W. 1936. Note on the pure theory of capital transfer. In Explorations in economics, Taussig Festschrift, New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
- Mantel, R. 1982. Substitutability and the welfare effects of endowment increases. Paper presented at the Econometric Society Meeting in Mexico.Google Scholar
- Mas-Colell, A. 1976. En torno a una propiedad poco atractiva del equilibrio competitivo. Moneday Credito [Madrid] 136: 11–27.Google Scholar
- Thomson, W. 1979. The equilibrium allocations of Walras and Lindahl manipulation games. Discussion Paper, University of Minnesota, Center of Economic Research, no. 111.Google Scholar