The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Revelation of Preferences

  • J. J. Laffont
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1549

Abstract

Competitive rational consumers reveal their preferences through their market behaviour as was made clear by Samuelson’s (1947) revealed preference approach and by the literature on demand theory. Any bundle of commodities less costly than his chosen bundle must be less appreciated by a rational consumer than his chosen bundle.

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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • J. J. Laffont
    • 1
  1. 1.