Abstract
Economic studies of exchange examine processes in which agents obtain gains from trade, e.g. bilateral bargaining and contracting, auctions, and multilateral markets. Prominent descriptive theories include idealized versions that assume agents simply respond to prices that clear markets. Realistic versions recognize effects of procedural rules and strategic behavior, and various impediments such as incomplete or unenforceable contracts, insufficient markets, imperfect information, and incomplete observability. Normative versions design market procedures, contract forms, and settlement rules that strengthen incentives and promote efficient outcomes.
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Wilson, R.B. (2018). Exchange. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_136
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_136
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