The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Shapley Value

  • Sergiu Hart
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1369

Abstract

The Shapley value is an a priori evaluation of the prospects of a player in a multi-person game. Introduced by Lloyd S. Shapley in 1953, it has become a central solution concept in cooperative game theory. The Shapley value has been applied to economic, political, and other models.

Keywords

Banzhaf index Coalitions Competitive equilibrium Cooperative game theory Cost allocation Games in coalitional form Large games Market games Perfect competition Political power Shapley value Shapley–Shubik index Side payments Transferable utility Value equivalence principle 
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© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sergiu Hart
    • 1
  1. 1.