Marketing boards (state-controlled or state-sanctioned entities legally granted control over the purchase or sale of agricultural commodities) flourished in the 20th century. Since the mid-1980s they have declined in number under pressure from domestic liberalization and from international trade rules that increasingly cover agriculture. Where reforms have been widespread and successful, marketing boards have vanished or retreated to providing public goods, such as strategic grain reserves or insurance against extraordinary price fluctuations. Elsewhere, the weaknesses of private agricultural marketing channels have been revealed by the rollback of marketing boards, often leading to calls for reinstatement of powerful marketing boards.
KeywordsAgricultural markets in developing countries Agriculture in economic development Contract enforcement Corruption Deregulation Great depression International monetary fund Lomé Convention Marketing boards Monopoly power Monopsony power Price control Price discrimination Price stabilization Privatization Protection Structural adjustment programmes Subsidies World Bank World Trade Organization
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