Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Multi-sided Platforms

  • Living reference work entry
  • First Online:
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

Abstract

This essay provides an overview of the basic economics literature on multi-sided platforms, focusing on ways in which they businesses differ from ordinary single-sided businesses. Distinctive aspects of startup, pricing, welfare analysis, and competition are discussed.

Multi-sided platforms reduce transactions costs and thereby facilitate value-creating interactions between two or more different types of economic agents.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Bibliography

  • Armstrong, M. 2006. Competition in two-sided markets. RAND Journal of Economics 37: 668–691.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baxter, W. 1983. Bank interchange of transactional paper: Legal and economic perspectives. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 541–588.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bedre-Defolie, Ö., and E. Calvano. 2013. Pricing payment cards. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5: 206–231.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caillaud, B., and B. Jullien. 2003. Chicken and egg: Competition among intermediation service providers. RAND Journal of Economics 34: 309–328.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eisenmann, T.R., G. Parker, and M. Van Alstyne. 2011. Platform envelopment. Strategic Management Journal 32: 1270–1285.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Evans, D.S. 2003a. Some empirical aspects of multi-sided platforms. Review of Network Economics 2: 1–19.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Evans, D.S. 2003b. The antitrust economics of multi-sided platforms markets. Yale Journal on Regulation 20: 327–379.

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans, D.S., and R. Schmalensee. 2005. Paying with plastic: The digital revolution in buying and borrowing. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans, D.S., and R. Schmalensee. 2007. Catalyst code: The strategies behind the world’s most dynamic companies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans, D.S., and R. Schmalensee. 2010. Failure to launch: Critical mass in platform businesses. Review of Network Economics 9: 1–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Evans, D.S., and R. Schmalensee. 2015. The antitrust analysis of multi-sided platform businesses. In Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, ed. R.D. Blair and D.D. Sokol, 404–447. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans, D.S., and R. Schmalensee. 2016. Matchmakers: The new economics of multisided platforms. Boston: Harvard Business Review Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hagiu, A. 2009. Two-sided platforms: Product variety and pricing structures. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 18: 1011–1043.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jullien, B. 2011. Competition in multi-sided networks: Divide and conquer. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3: 1–35.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parker, G.G. and M.W. Van Alstyne. 2000. Internetwork externalities and free information goods. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 107–216. New York: Association for Computing Machinery.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rochet, J.-C., and J. Tirole. 2003. Platform competition in two-sided markets. Journal of the European Economic Association 1: 990–1029.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rochet, J.-C., and J. Tirole. 2006. Two-sided markets: A progress report. RAND Journal of Economics 37: 645–667.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schmalensee, R. 2011. Why is platform pricing generally highly skewed? Review of Network Economics 10: 1–11.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spence, A.M. 1975. Monopoly, quality, and regulation. Bell Journal of Economics 6: 417–429.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tirole, J. 2011. Payment card regulation and the use of economic analysis in antitrust. Competition Policy International 7: 137–158.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weyl, E.G. 2010. A price theory of multi-sided platforms. American Economic Review 100: 1642–1672.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Market Platform Dynamics, Boston, USA

    David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee

Authors
  1. David S. Evans
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Richard Schmalensee
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to David S. Evans .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

    Section Editor information

    1. No affiliation provided

      Robert Picard

    Copyright information

    © 2017 The Author(s)

    About this entry

    Cite this entry

    Evans, D.S., Schmalensee, R. (2017). Multi-sided Platforms. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_3069-1

    Download citation

    • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_3069-1

    • Received:

    • Accepted:

    • Published:

    • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

    • Print ISBN: 978-1-349-95121-5

    • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-95121-5

    • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

    Publish with us

    Policies and ethics

    Search

    Navigation