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Shapley, Lloyd S. (Born 1923)

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Abstract

Lloyd Shapley is considered one of the pioneers of game theory. His most prominent contributions are the inception and study of value theory and core theory. These two theories are the key to solving problems involving the allocation of goods or payoffs achievable through cooperation. Shapley’s contributions have led to a broad range of important achievements, such as the exploration of stable solutions for matching and exchange, the measurement of power and a deeper understanding of market economies. His contributions to non-cooperative game theory include the introduction of stochastic games, strategic market games and potential games. Shapley shared with Alvin E. Roth the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences.

This chapter was originally published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Online edition, 2013. Edited by Palgrave Macmillan

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  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Manel Baucells, Raul Lejano & Cheng-Zhong Qin

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  3. Cheng-Zhong Qin
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    Baucells, M., Lejano, R., Qin, CZ. (2013). Shapley, Lloyd S. (Born 1923). In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2866-1

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    • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2866-1

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