Abstract
The following three articles survey some aspects of the foundations of noncooperative game theory. The goal of work in foundations is to examine in detail the basic ingredients of game analysis.
This chapter was originally published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, 2008. Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume
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Bibliography
Aumann, R., and A. Brandenburger. 1995. Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium. Econometrica 63: 1161–1180.
Harsanyi, J. 1967–8. Games with incomplete information played by ‘Bayesian’ players, I–III. Management Science 14, 159–182, 320–334, 486–502.
Von Neumann, J., and O. Morgenstern. 1944. Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 60th anniversary edn, 2004.
My thanks to Rena Henderson and Michael James. The Stern School of Business provided financial support.
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Brandenburger, A. (2008). Epistemic Game Theory: An Overview. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2837-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2837-1
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Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-95121-5
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