Abstract
This article surveys recent work aimed at evaluating the welfare effects of campaign finance reform. The theoretical literature distinguishes two types of contributor: those who desire ideological policies and those who want personal favours. A series of models shows that these different types of contributor have different implications for campaign finance regulation. The models also give some suggestions about the sort of empirical evidence that would argue for or against certain campaign finance regulations. These suggestions have been followed up by recent empirical work.
This chapter was originally published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, 2008. Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume
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Ashworth, S. (2008). Campaign Finance, Economics of. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2749-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2749-1
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