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Procurement

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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

Abstract

Firms and government agencies rely increasingly on goods and services procured from outside suppliers. How to assure desired quality at a minimal cost in the procurement is often challenging and warrants carefully devised contracting policies. This article reviews several problems arising in procurement and policies designed to remedy them.

This chapter was originally published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, 2008. Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume

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  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Yeon-Koo Che

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  1. Yeon-Koo Che
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    Che, YK. (2008). Procurement. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2716-1

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    • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2716-1

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    • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

    • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-95121-5

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