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Epistemic Game Theory: Complete Information

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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

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Abstract

The epistemic programme can be viewed as a methodical construction of game theory from its most basic elements – rationality and irrationality, belief and knowledge about such matters, beliefs about beliefs, knowledge about knowledge, and so on. To date, the epistemic field has been mainly focused on game matrices and trees – that is, on the non-cooperative branch of game theory. It has been used to provide foundations for existing non-cooperative solution concepts, and also to uncover new solution concepts. The broader goal of the programme is to provide a method of analysing different sets of assumptions about games in a precise and uniform manner.

This chapter was originally published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, 2008. Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume

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  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Adam Brandenburger

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    Brandenburger, A. (2008). Epistemic Game Theory: Complete Information. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2642-1

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    • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2642-1

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    • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-95121-5

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