Abstract
Fiscal federalism is concerned with the division of policy responsibilities among different levels of government and with the fiscal interactions among these governments. Public service provision by lower-level governments can be efficiency-enhancing, although competition for mobile resources can also interfere with efficient resource allocation both in the public and private sectors. Intergovernmental transfers affect the overall equity and efficiency properties of public policies. Global economic integration and political and economic reforms in developing and transition economies – which have institutional contexts very different from those of the mature federations – present important challenges for a ‘second generation’ of federalism research.
This chapter was originally published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, 2008. Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume
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Wildasin, D.E. (2008). Fiscal Federalism. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_226-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_226-2
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Latest
Fiscal Federalism- Published:
- 17 March 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_226-2
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Original
Fiscal Federalism- Published:
- 16 November 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_226-1