Abstract
Tax competition refers to strategic tax-setting in a non-cooperative game between jurisdictions – whether countries or states or provinces within a federation – with each setting some parameters of its tax system in relation to the taxes set by others. This creates a potential case for international tax coordination, though the revenue impact has as yet been modest (at least in OECD countries). Conflicting national interests make it difficult to design effective coordination schemes.
This chapter was originally published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, 2008. Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume
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Keen, M. (2008). Tax Competition. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2156-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2156-1
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