Skip to main content

Experimental Economics

  • Living reference work entry
  • First Online:

Abstract

Experimental methods have features in common across all the sciences. All tend to use the framework of falsification, but there is inherent ambiguity in knowing which of the many hypotheses necessary to construct a test are negated by observations contrary to predictions. This ambiguity tends to engender much discussion, contestability and the design of new experiments that attempt to resolve the open qsts. This social process is not part of the logic of scientific testing, but it explains what scientists do and how new results become established.

This chapter was originally published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, 2008. Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Bibliography

  • Angel, R. 2001. Future optical and infrared telescopes. Nature Insights 409: 427–430.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Banks, J., M. Olson, D. Porter, S. Rassenti, and V. Smith. 2003. Theory, experiment and the federal communications commission spectrum auctions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 51: 303–350.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Born, M. 1943. Experiment and theory in physics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burnham, T., K. McCabe, and V. Smith. 2000. Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 43: 57–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Camerer, C.F., and R.M. Hogarth. 1999. The effects of financial incentives in experiments: A review and capital-labor-production framework. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 19: 7–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Camerer, C., G. Loewenstein, and D. Prelec. 2005. Neuroeconomics: How neuroeconomics can inform economics. Journal of Economic Literature 43: 9–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cox, J., V. Smith, and J. Walker. 1988. Theory and individual behavior of first price auctions. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1: 61–99. Reprinted in Smith (1991).

    Google Scholar 

  • Davis, D., and C. Holt. 1993. Experimental economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davis, D., and A. Williams. 1991. The Hayek hypothesis in experimental auctions: Institutional effects and market power. Economic Inquiry 29: 261–274.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Einstein, A. 1905. On the electrodynamics of moving bodies. In The collected papers of Albert Einstein, vol. 2, trans. A. Beck, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  • Einstein, A. 1907. On the relativity principle and the conclusions drawn from it. In The collected papers of Albert Einstein, vol. 2, trans. A. Beck. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  • Einstein, A. 1934. The world as I see it. New York: Covici Friede Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feyeraband, P. 1975. Against method. London: Versa.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fölsing, A. 1997. Albert Einstein. New York: Viking.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, M. 1953. Essays in positive economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grandin, T., and C. Johnson. 2005. Animals in translation. New York: Scriber.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guala, F. 2005. The methodology of experimental economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Harrison, G., J. McInnes, and L. Rutstroem. 2005. Risk aversion and incentive effects: Comment. American Economic Review 95: 897–901.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, F.A. 1942. Scientism and the study of society. Economica; reprinted in The Counter-Revolution in Science. Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, F.A. 1945. The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review 35: 519–530.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, F.A. 1967. Studies in philosophy, politics and economics. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, F.A. 1978. Competition as a discovery procedure. In New studies in philosophy, politics, economics, and the history. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Reprinted in The Essence of Hayek. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hertwig, R., and A. Ortmann. 2001. Experimental practices in economics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24: 383–451.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoffman, E., K. McCabe, K. Shachat, and V. Smith. 1994. Preferences, property rights and anonymity in bargaining games. Games and Economic Behavior 7: 346–380.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hoffman, E., K. McCabe, and V. Smith. 1996. On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games. International Journal of Game Theory 25: 289–301.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holt, C. 1989. The exercise of market power in experiments. Journal of Law and Economics 32S: 107–130.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holt, C., and S. Laury. 2001. Varying the scale of financial incentives under real and hypothetical conditions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24: 417–418.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holt, C., L. Langan, and A. Villamil. 1986. Market power in oral double auction experiments. Economic Inquiry 24: 107–123.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kagel, J., and A. Roth. 1995. Handbook of experimental economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman, D., J. Knetsch, and R. Thaler. 1986. Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: Entitlements in the market. American Economic Review 76: 728–741.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lakatos, I. 1978. The methodology of scientific research programmers. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Leamer, E. 1978. Specification searches. New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayo, D. 1996. Error and the growth of experimental knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • McCabe, K., and V. Smith. 2000. A comparison of naïve and sophisticated subject behavior with game theoretic prediction. Proceedings National Academy of Sciences 97: 3777–3781.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCabe, K., S. Rassenti, and V.L. Smith. 1989. Designing smart computer assisted markets for gas networks. European Journal of Political Economy 5: 259–283.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCabe, K., Rassenti, S. and Smith, V.L. 1998. Reciprocity, trust and payoff privacy in extensive form bargaining. Games and Economic Behavior 24: 10–24. Reprinted in Smith (2000).

    Google Scholar 

  • Northrup, F.S.C. 1969. Einstein’s conception of science. In Albert Einstein: Philosopher–scientist, ed. P.A. Schilpp. LaSalle: Open Court.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pirsig, R.M. 1981. Zen and the art of motorcycle maintenance. New York: Banton Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rassenti, S. 1981. O-1 decision problems with multiple resource constrains: Algorithms and applications. Ph.D. thesis, University of Arizona.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rassenti, S., and V. Smith. 1986. Electric utility deregulation. In Pricing electric gas and telecommunication services. Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Regulation.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rassenti, S., V. Smith, and R. Bulfin. 1982. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell Journal of Economics 13: 402–417.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rassenti, S., V. Smith, and B. Wilson. 2002. Using experiments to inform the privatization/deregulation movement in electricity. Cato Journal 21: 515–544.

    Google Scholar 

  • Robinson, J. 1979. What are the qsts? Journal of Economic Literature 15: 1318–1339.

    Google Scholar 

  • Samuelson, P. 1966. Intertemporal price equilibrium: A prologue to the theory of speculation. In The collected papers of Paul A. Samuelson, ed. J. Stiglitz, vol. 2. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Samuelson, P., and W. Nordhaus. 1985. Economics. New York: McGraw-Hill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Segrè, E. 1984. From falling bodies to radio waves. New York: Freeman.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shubik, M. 1959. Strategy and market structure. New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, V.L. 1962. An experimental study of competitive market behavior. Journal of Political Economy 70: 111–137.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, V.L. 1965. Experimental auction markets and the Walrasian hypothesis. Journal of Political Economy 73: 387–393.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, V.L. 1976. Experimental economics: Induced value theory. American Economic Review Proceedings 66: 274–279 .Reprinted in Smith (1980; 1991)

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, V.L. 1980. Evaluation of econometric models. New York: Academic Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, V.L. 1991. Papers in experimental economics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, V.L. 2000. Bargaining and market behavior. Essays in experimental economics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, V. 2003. Constructivist and ecological rationality in economics. American Economic Review 93: 465–508.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, V.L., and F. Szidarovszky. 2004. Monetary rewards and decision cost in strategic interactions. In Models of a man: Essays in memory of Herbert A. Simon, ed. M. Augier and J. March. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, V., and J. Walker. 1993. Monetary rewards and decision cost in experimental economics. Economic Inquiry 31: 245–261 .Best Article Award, Western Economic Association, 1993

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, V., K. McCabe, and S. Rassenti. 1991. Lakatos and experimental economics. In Appraising economic theories, ed. N. De Marchi and M. Blaug. London: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • Soberg, M. 2005. The Duhem–Quine thesis and experimental economics: A reinpt. Journal of Economic Methodology 12: 581–597.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stigler, G. 1957. Perfect competition, historically contemplated. Journal of Political Economy 65: 1–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suppes, P. 1969. Models of data. In Studies in the methodology and foundations of science. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Williams, A. 1980. Computerized double-auction markets: Some initial experimental results. Journal of Business 53: 235–257.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Copyright information

© 2008 The Author(s)

About this entry

Cite this entry

Smith, V.L. (2008). Experimental Economics. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2122-1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2122-1

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-95121-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

Publish with us

Policies and ethics