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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics pp 1–5Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Experimental Labour Economics

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Abstract

Experimental labour economics uses experimental techniques to improve our understanding of labour economics issues. We start by putting experimental data into perspective with the data-sets typically used by empirical labour economists. We then discuss several examples of how experiments can inform labour economics.

Keywords

  • Double auction
  • Efficiency wages
  • Employment relation
  • Experimental labour economics
  • Gift exchange
  • Implicit incentives
  • Incomplete contracts
  • Involuntary unemployment
  • Laboratory experiments
  • Labour economics
  • Labour market institutions
  • Minimum wages
  • Moral hazard
  • Opportunistic behaviour
  • Performance incentives
  • Piece rates
  • Repeated games
  • Reservation wage
  • Tournaments
  • Wage rigidity

JEL Classifications

  • C9

This chapter was originally published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, 2008. Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Armin Falk & Simon Gächter

Authors
  1. Armin Falk
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  2. Simon Gächter
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    © 2008 The Author(s)

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    Falk, A., Gächter, S. (2008). Experimental Labour Economics. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2005-1

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    • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2005-1

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    • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

    • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-95121-5

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