Experimental labour economics uses experimental techniques to improve our understanding of labour economics issues. We start by putting experimental data into perspective with the data-sets typically used by empirical labour economists. We then discuss several examples of how experiments can inform labour economics.
- Double auction
- Efficiency wages
- Employment relation
- Experimental labour economics
- Gift exchange
- Implicit incentives
- Incomplete contracts
- Involuntary unemployment
- Laboratory experiments
- Labour economics
- Labour market institutions
- Minimum wages
- Moral hazard
- Opportunistic behaviour
- Performance incentives
- Piece rates
- Repeated games
- Reservation wage
- Wage rigidity
This chapter was originally published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, 2008. Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume
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Falk, A., Gächter, S. (2008). Experimental Labour Economics. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2005-1
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-95121-5
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