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Managerial Discretion

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Abstract

Managerial discretion is the latitude that executives have to affect the activities of the companies they run, as opposed to merely accepting internal and external influences. There are two distinct streams of literature. In one, agency theory, managers are assumed to be opportunistic and likely to misallocate firm resources to their own use unless restrained by well-designed incentives, weighty governance or heavy debt burdens that limit the availability of discretionary capital. The other stream is sanguine about managerial motivation and measures discretion by the financial latitude that management has to allocate or reallocate resources to high-yield purposes. Empirical research is ongoing in both streams.

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Correspondence to Greg Linden .

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Linden, G., Teece, D.J. (2016). Managerial Discretion. In: Augier, M., Teece, D. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94848-2_738-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94848-2_738-1

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