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Trade Secret

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Abstract

This entry provides a summary of issues on trade secret both as a legal concept and as a research subject. First, it discusses the general standards that are commonly used in the definition of trade secret and the precautionary measures and the legal system for trade secrecy. It also compares the advantages and disadvantages of the legal protection of trade secrets with that of patents, while pointing out the supplemental role of trade secret. Next, two streams of academic literature are reviewed, on firms’ strategic incentives for disclosing confidential information to competitors and to channel partners respectively. The issues examined in the economics of trade secret law are also briefly addressed.

This entry was originally published on Palgrave Connect under ISBN 978-1-137-49190-9. The content has not been changed.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Marketing, The Econometric Society, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China

    Liang Guo

Authors
  1. Liang Guo
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Liang Guo .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Stanford University , Stanford, California, USA

    Mie Augier

  2. Tusher Ctr Intellectual Capital, University of California Tusher Ctr Intellectual Capital, Berkeley, California, USA

    David J. Teece

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© 2016 The Author(s)

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Guo, L. (2016). Trade Secret. In: Augier, M., Teece, D. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94848-2_528-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94848-2_528-1

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-94848-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Business and ManagementReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

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