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Williamson, Oliver E. (Born 1932)

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The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management

Abstract

Oliver E. Williamson is the 2009 co-recipient (with Elinor Ostrom) of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, awarded ‘for his analysis of economic governance, especially the boundaries of the firm’. Williamson’s research, particularly his development of transaction cost economics, has made him one of the most influential scholars in the field of strategic management. By providing a systematic way of analysing the relative merits of alternative governance arrangements and a set of testable propositions relating those merits to attributes of transactions and the surrounding environment, Williamson’s framework offers strategy a set of normative rules for choosing among alternative organizational arrangements. This entry reviews his early career and contributions, the development and central features of transaction cost economics and Williamson’s influence on management scholarship.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Michigan, Ross School of Business, 701 Tappan Street, Ann Arbor, MI, USA

    Scott E. Masten

Authors
  1. Scott E. Masten
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Scott E. Masten .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. GSBPP, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA

    Mie Augier

  2. Berkeley Research Group, LLC, Emeryville, CA, USA

    David J. Teece

  3. Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA

    David J. Teece

Copyright information

© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd., part of Springer Nature

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Cite this entry

Masten, S.E. (2018). Williamson, Oliver E. (Born 1932). In: Augier, M., Teece, D.J. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-00772-8_662

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