The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

Living Edition
| Editors: Matias Vernengo, Esteban Perez Caldentey, Barkley J. Rosser Jr

Matching and Market Design

  • Muriel Niederle
  • Alvin E. Roth
  • Tayfun Sönmez
Living reference work entry


Matching is the part of economics concerned with who transacts with whom, and how. Models of matching, starting with the Gale–Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, have been particularly useful in studying labour markets and in helping design clearing houses to fix market failures. Studying how markets fail also gives us insight into how marketplaces work well. They need to provide a thick, uncongested market in which it is safe to participate. Clearing houses that do this have been designed for many entry-level professional labour markets, for the assignment of children to public schools, and for exchange of live-donor kidneys for transplantation.


Centralized matching Clearing houses Congestion Kidney exchange Labour markets Market design Marriage markets Matching Medical labour markets National resident matching program School choice One-sided and two-sided markets Priority algorithms Revelation of preferences Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms Two-sided markets 

JEL Classifications

C78 L1 
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Muriel Niederle
    • 1
  • Alvin E. Roth
    • 1
  • Tayfun Sönmez
    • 1
  1. 1.