The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

Living Edition
| Editors: Palgrave Macmillan

Experimental Economics, History of

  • Francesco Guala
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2184-1

Abstract

Contemporary experimental economics was born in the 1950s from the combination of the experimental method used in psychology and new developments in economic theory. Early experimental studies of bargaining behaviour, social dilemmas, individual decision making and market institutions were followed by a long period of underground growth, until the booming of the field in the 1980s and 1990s.

Keywords

Allais paradox Allais, M Auctions (experiments) Bargaining Behavioural economics Cardinal utility Convergence Decision theory Expected utility Experimental economics Experimental economics, history of Friedman, M Game theory Gaming Kahneman, D Learning Mathematics and economics Mechanism design Mill, J. S Models Other-regarding preferences Plott, C Positive economics Preference reversals Prisoner’s dilemma Public goods Ramsey, F Savage, L Selten, R Siegel, S Simon, H Smith, V Stanford Value Project Statistics and economics Subgame perfection Subjective probability Tversky, A Ultimatum game Utility measurement Von Neumann and Morgenstern 

JEL Classifications

B4 
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Francesco Guala
    • 1
  1. 1.