The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

Living Edition
| Editors: Palgrave Macmillan

Strategic Reallocations of Endowments

  • Zvi Safra
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_1806-1
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Abstract

In the framework of pure exchange economies it might well happen that economic agents will find it advantageous to change their endowment holdings and by this increase their utility. Such an increase is achieved by acting competitively with the new endowments and comparing the new equilibrium allocation with the one that would have been achieved without the change.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Economic Agent Strategic Behaviour Utility Level Initial Endowment 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  • Zvi Safra
    • 1
  1. 1.