The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

Living Edition
| Editors: Palgrave Macmillan

Voting

  • Nicholas R. Miller
Living reference work entry
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_1672-1
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Abstract

Virtually all economic doctrines prescribe that certain activities – for example, the provision of public goods – be undertaken by government. Accordingly, such doctrines implicitly prescribe that certain allocative decisions – for example, determining the level of supply of public goods – be made by political rather than market processes. Thus voting (and government decision making generally), though logically a part of political science, is of clear relevance to economic theory.

Keywords

Majority Rule Median Voter Condorcet Winner Approval Vote Vote Procedure 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nicholas R. Miller
    • 1
  1. 1.