The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

Living Edition
| Editors: Palgrave Macmillan

Myopic Decision Rules

  • Mordecai Kurz
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_1261-1

Abstract

In a dynamic context a decision maker at any instant t has information about his exogenous economic environment both at time t and at later dates. We represent the environment at t by a vector x(t) of exogenous variables, and their future values by \( \left(x\left(t+1\right),x\left(t+2\right),\dots, x\left(t+T\right)\right) \). The horizon T is determined by such considerations as length of life, technology, resource limitations etc.; it might be infinite. A decision rule at time t is a map ψ t associating with a vector of variables z the variable d representing the choice of the decision maker. We write \( d={\psi}_t(z) \). Myopic decision rules refer to those maps of the form \( d(t)={\psi}_t\left(x(t)\right) \) in which d(t) depends only upon the values of the exogenous variables at time t, disregarding any information about future conditions of the economic environment. A decision rule is said to be non-myopic if it is of the form \( d(t)={\psi}_t\left(x(t),x\left(t=1\right),\dots, x\left(t+T\right)\right) \).

Keywords

Decision Rule Perfect Competition Internal Debt Permanent Income Hypothesis Consistent Plan 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mordecai Kurz
    • 1
  1. 1.