Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of the Subject
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) is considered by many to be one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. His work in the philosophy of logic, mathematics, mind, and language established him as one of the founders of two movements – logical empiricism (the Vienna Circle) and Oxford-style ordinary language analysis. The impact of his work has been felt in the arts, humanities, and social sciences and strongly influenced the directions of both analytic and post-analytical philosophy. His work is difficult to read and interpret, and there are many competing interpretations of his philosophy. This brief introduction is designed to introduce students to the man and his work through a reading that emphasizes a broadly cultural approach to his intellectual background, context, and life, recording the influence his thought has exerted on the disciplines, including education and pedagogy.
The analytic revolution in philosophy of education, what Stefaan Cuypers and Christopher Martin (2009) call “a singular analytical paradigm for puzzle-solving in the philosophy of education,” was conceived by R. S. Peters as “conceptually foundational” in the sense that it involved “the analysis of concepts [constitutive of education] and with questions about the grounds of knowledge, belief, actions and activities” as a “necessary preliminary to answering other philosophical questions” (p. 5). In the same volume dedicated to a sympathetic rereading of R. S. Peters, Laverty (2009, p. 33) maintains, “Peters was clearly influenced by the revolution of post-war philosophy, particularly Wittgenstein’s original contribution; but he also strove to establish the revolution’s continuity” with the history of philosophy. Laverty (2009, p. 30) indicates that “Peters rarely theorized his analytic approach to philosophy of education” and that although he appealed to Wittgenstein on linguistic usage and the concept of games, “Peters held that Wittgenstein was wrong to overlook the possibility of a ‘general principle’ that distinguishes all games.” Peters’ contribution to the analytic paradigm was based on a commitment to a form of conceptual analysis that implied a view of philosophy as a second-order discipline that casts philosophers of education as “underlabourers in the garden of knowledge” (Peters 1966, p. 15).
The argument is that R. S. Peters’ analytic paradigm was based on an appeal to Wittgenstein that was misplaced and represents a gross mistaken misreading of Wittgenstein. By contrast, this entry proposes a reading of the work of the later Wittgenstein which both unsettles the view of Wittgenstein as a placeholder in the analytic tradition and provides interpretive grounds for viewing him closer to the tradition of Continental philosophy and as a thinker deeply influenced by Krauss, Spengler, Nietzsche, and Freud who embrace the notion of philosophy as a form of cultural criticism (Peters and Marshall 1999; Peters 2002a, b; Peters et al. 2008). The “postmodern” appropriation of the later Wittgenstein marks him out as a philosopher who anticipated central aspects of the reevaluation of the culture of modernity. This entry broadens this interpretation to outline a view of subjectivity, knowledge, and representation “after” Wittgenstein, a position that provides a more appropriate platform for philosophy of education in the age of globalization, preserving a link to Wittgenstein and his philosophy while investigating the sources for a notion of education as openness, engagement, and copoiesis. The entry provides an account of the Cartesian philosophy of subjectivity and Wittgenstein’s attempt to provide a break with the Cartesian worldview that is much more important for contemporary philosophy of education than reference to a method of conceptual analysis that views philosophy as a meta-discipline. In the next section, Wittgenstein’s anti-Cartesianism is explored as a basis for deconstructing Descartes’ view of mind, human beings, and modern philosophy.
Descartes and the Philosophy of Subjectivity
The philosophy of subjectivity has been one of the crowning achievements of Western philosophy that has help to shape and define modern philosophy, the foundations of science, liberal political and education thought, and the culture of modernity. Of all philosophers responsible for the subjective turn and for the subsequent epistemological foundations and direction of modern philosophy, René Descartes deserves special mention. In his own lifetime, his reputation rested on his contributions to mathematics and cosmology and only in the nineteenth century did his metaphysics and epistemology contribute to the Kantian project of reconstituting the nature of philosophy. His skepticism becomes important in the revival of Anglophone empiricist epistemology in the twentieth century, and his idea of the self as a locus of subjectivity independent of the world – its ethical and political implications – began to impact French and German philosophy from the 1930s with philosophical engagement of his work by Husserl, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, among others (Gaukroker 2008).
Descartes’ “epistemological turn” (after Bergmann) is one of the centers of his works that lead him to counter skepticism by locating certainty in subjective consciousness and set modern philosophy on a path intimately connected to theory of knowledge and later embellished by Kant’s transcendental argument concerning synthetic a priori knowledge. Barry Stroud (2008, p. 513) suggests, “The philosophical, mathematical and scientific of Descartes is now so deep and so pervasive in our culture that its full extent can no longer be measured with certainty or precision.” Descartes’ philosophy of mind embraced a mind/body dualism, individualism about mental contents and adherence to a strong doctrine of privileged first-person access that holds introspective judgments about one’s own mental states enjoy the privileged epistemic status of infallibility and immunity to error. Descartes was acknowledged by Husserl as “the genuine patriarch of phenomenology” and christened his own phenomenology a new Cartesianism. Heidegger, by contrast, saw the Cartesianism as a fundamental wrong turn and rebelled against its legacy suggesting that the cogito sum had to be “phenomenologically destroyed” (see Martin 2008, p. 496).
The words “subject” and “subjectivity” have many different meanings. The word “subject” comes from the Latin word “subjectum” which means something under or constituting the foundations of other things. In Aristotle “subject” is not a philosophical category that belongs to human beings and does not function as a philosophical category nor is it considered to take any kind of precedence to the concept of substance. “Subject” in addition to the use that Descartes firms up as a metaphysical dominant category as the mind, ego, or agent that sustains or assumes the form of thought or consciousness also carries the medieval political meaning of “vassal” – someone who owes fealty to a monarch one who lives in the territory and owes allegiance to a sovereign power. This is the political and ethical meaning of subject that Michel Foucault exploits in his studies of subjectivity. Subjectivity has been used to mean many things: consciousness, intentionality, the will, individual volition, and introspection.
An understanding of the significance of Wittgenstein’s work as breaking with and offering a critique of the Cartesian model of subjectivity is more significant to philosophy of education than the method of conceptual analysis that R. S. Peters and other analytical philosophers of education extract in an appeal to the work of Wittgenstein. It is both more fundamental and provides a basis for a critique of various claims of essentialism in the philosophy of the subject, which is so important in the age of globalization when claims to identity and difference have come to the fore. The Cartesian model of subjectivity arises out of a certain picture or image of the knowing subject deeply embedded in the medieval culture of theology and scholastic philosophy (even though it tries to break with these influences) and a mathematical conception of certainty that is seen as providing appropriate foundations for knowledge. As Wittgenstein (1953, §115) suggests (speaking of the “picture language” and the general form of a proposition in the Tractatus), “a picture held us captive, and we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.” The question so important to philosophy and the nature of education is how to dissemble this metaphysical Cartesian world picture that comprises the foundations of modern philosophy through the binary oppositions from mind/body, subject/object, inner/outer to word/object, signifier/signified, self/other, and male/female. On this view Wittgensteinian philosophy of education is an approach in part dedicated to the unpacking and critique of the Cartesian dualist theory of mind and the foundational epistemology that appeals to “certainty” and to accurate representation. On a Wittgensteinian approach, the dualist theory of mind gives way to the study of subjectivity as a result of cultural and historical influences, and both knowledge and learning are not seen as wedded to foundations in any sense. The Wittgensteinian view is thus both anti-foundational and antirepresentational (of an independently existing reality).
In the Investigations and later works, Wittgenstein wrestles with the Cartesian picture of subjectivity and its implications for knowledge and representation, providing us with an alternative vocabulary to discuss the Cartesian picture of mind as objects which possess properties and as a nonphysical substance that thinks, famously referred to as the ghost in the machine (Gilbert Ryle’s expression). Wittgenstein takes on this philosophical struggle to unseat Descartes’ view of mind as both an essentialist and dualist conception – internalist, private, and nonphysical – that arises from his view of nature and science as proceeding from mechanistic (“mechanics”) principles and a view of knowledge that embraces a form of epistemic internalism that holds that “the difference between true belief and knowledge consists in some form of justification and, crucially, that justification consists in factors that are, in some sense, internal to the subject of the belief” (Rowlands 2008, p. 6). The Cartesian picture of mind involves many different threads, not just a conception of mind, but also a view of knowledge and representation, an image of philosophy, and a view of the nature of human beings. Dislodging this picture by disassembling it and describing it as mythology (as legitimating a certain world picture) requires something more than argument or conceptual analysis. Wittgenstein demonstrates that dislodging the deeply embedded culture of Cartesianism is not a matter of proposing better arguments or of argumentation per se but rather rests on a variety of other rhetorical strategies. This point has a clear set of implications for Wittgensteinian pedagogy – teachers must engage with the emotions and imagination of students.
It is worth noting in passing that the appeal to Wittgenstein by R.S. Peters on the “revolution in philosophy” does nothing to justify the method of conceptual analysis he advocates but rarely spells out: Wittgenstein contra Peters does not see philosophy in any way as a foundational, second-order activity based on the clarification of concepts. While the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus may have seen philosophy as a critique of language using logical analysis to reveal the general form of the proposition “in order to see the world rightly,” it does not result in linguistic hygiene or the ultimate meaning of concepts. His later conception of language games, family resemblance, and “meaning as use” further distances Wittgenstein from anything like Peters’ conceptual analysis: first, we must look to the variety of uses to which the word is put which is purely descriptive rather than explanatory or prescriptive; second, we must be aware of the diversity and multiplicity of uses that only have life within a language game and form of life; third, a concept or word only has meaning in the context of a sentence and sentences within the network of judgments; fourth, while language games have rules, these cannot be learned theoretically but only in practice; fifth, by following the use, we discover only “a complicated network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing” (Investigations, 66), a family resemblance, that resists all explanation and definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions; sixth, the rules of grammar liberated from the bounds of strict logic express the norms of language and tell us what kind of object anything is (Investigations, 371, 373) for they are embedded in the culture and “the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life” (Investigations, 23). No reading of Wittgenstein validates or justifies anything like Peters’ version of conceptual analysis. Wittgenstein would only accept a form of analysis as a kind of therapeutic activity of “assembling reminders for a particular purpose” (Investigations, 127). As he writes in the Investigations, “there is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies” (133). The aim of philosophy is “to shew the fly out of the fly-bottle” (Investigations, 309).
It is significant that for Wittgenstein language is not the foundation – words and justifications come to an end (On Certainty, 192) on the base of “hinge propositions” which are neither true nor false but “remain firm” for us. When Wittgenstein writes: “Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; − but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game” (On Certainty, 204), Wittgenstein is suggesting that there is only cultural practice at the bottom of our language games, an ungrounded way of acting. Contrary to Descartes’ starting point of the indubitability of the self-reflecting cogito as offering the foundations of knowledge based on a mathematical model of certainty that ultimately leads to a self-stultifying solipsistic self, Wittgenstein both naturalizes and socializes cognitive processes locating them first in language and then as part of the activity of a culture. He is thus not a foundationalist in any accepted definition of the term. For him certainty and the very possibility of meaning lie in the background context without which propositions could not even be enunciated: “…I want to conceive [certainty] as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal” (On Certainty, 359).
The notion of philosophy as a kind of therapy has a set of link and references that take us back to the beginnings of philosophy and certainly to the Stoics who held “that emotions like fear or envy (or impassioned sexual attachments, or passionate love of anything whatsoever) either were or arose from false judgements and that the sage – a person who had attained moral and intellectual perfection – would not undergo them” (Baltzly 2014). The therapeutic notion of philosophy was intimately tied to the pursuit of the good life and philosophy as a therapy of emotions. Gordon Baker, among others, provides a therapeutic reading of Investigations that positions Wittgenstein as attempting to break us free of the impulse to metaphysics through an elaborately structured dialogue where the reader is encouraged to think for himself or herself. The work of Stanley Cavell, James Conant, and Cora Diamond regards Wittgenstein’s philosophy as entirely therapeutic, rather than as having any theoretical or metaphysical aspects. Certainly there are a range of comments by Wittgenstein scattered throughout his work where he uses the notion of therapy to describe his activity of doing philosophy such as “In philosophizing we may not terminate a disease of thought. It must run its natural course, and slow cure is all important” (Zettel, 382). Wittgenstein also extends this conception to education when he says, “I trot out all the problems that education represses without solving. I say to those repressed doubts: you are quite correct, go on asking, demand clarification” (Philosophical Grammar, p. 382). The justification of R.S. Peters’ approach to philosophy of education by means of a distinctive and foundational method of conceptual analysis does not hold water, and its justification cannot be found in Wittgenstein.
By contrast, the “new Wittgenstein” coalesces around a series of common interpretive protocols: Wittgenstein is not advancing theories in philosophy but rather employing a therapeutic method to deconstruct philosophical puzzles; he is helping us to work free of the conceptual confusions that become evident when we begin to philosophize; at the same time, Wittgenstein is disabusing us of the notion that we can stand outside language and command an external view and that such an external view is both necessary and possible for grasping the essence of thought and language. On the new reading, Wittgenstein encourages us to see that our intuitions about meaning and thought are best accommodated “by attention to our everyday forms of expression and to the world those forms of expression serve to reveal” (Crary and Read 2000, p. 1). This new schema for reading Wittgenstein puts less emphasis on the decisive break in his thought, represented by the Tractatus and the posthumous Investigations, to emphasize, by comparison, significant continuities of his thought centering around his therapeutic conception of philosophy. The new reading that emphasizes the therapeutic character of Wittgenstein’s philosophical aims and method is sympathetic to and consistent with the “postmodern” view of Wittgenstein (Peters and Marshall 1999) which explicitly provides an emphasis on a literary, cultural, and (auto)biographical reading of Wittgenstein’s works, their intertextuality, the expression of the spirit of European (Viennese) modernism in the Tractatus, and the anticipation of certain “postmodern” themes in his later works which, on the one hand, cast him in close philosophical proximity to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Heidegger and, on the other hand, project his writings into an interesting engagement with poststructuralist thought (Peters and Marshall 1999, pp. 19–20).
This cultural reading, in part, was inspired by Cavell’s work, which serves as an exemplar both in reading Wittgenstein in relation to the movement of modernism and against Wittgenstein’s Viennese cultural background where the influence of Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Freud is evident. Cavell’s writings draw widely upon the philosophical tradition and emphasize the parallels between Wittgenstein and many contemporary thinkers, including both Derrida and Foucault. It is a view that sits well with Wittgenstein as a pedagogical philosopher (Peters et al. 2010). In the “postmodern” reading, the Tractatus is seen to be modernist in its formalism, while the Investigations anticipates certain “postmodernist” themes including anti-foundationalism and antirepresentationalism (Peters and Marshall 1999). The distinction is principally a matter of the style of doing philosophy, and it is reflective of the impact of larger cultural forces upon Wittgenstein and, significantly, also the 7 years of Wittgenstein as an elementary schoolteacher in rural Austria. It does not deny that there are significant continuities in his thought, say, for instance, in his view of philosophy. In this reading it is possible to argue that the therapeutic aim became more manifest in Wittgenstein’s “pedagogical” style and in a view called “philosophy as pedagogy” (Peters and Marshall 1999). This view does not entail necessarily an account of “social constructivism” or imply that “postmodernism” (whatever that elusive term means) necessarily entails social constructivism in any of its versions. In one sense “postfoundational” is a better term that serves to provide a general philosophical direction in epistemology, learning, and ethics.
Anti- or post-epistemological standpoint
Anti-realism about meaning and reference
Suspicion of transcendental arguments and viewpoints
Rejection of the picture of knowledge as accurate representation
Rejection of truth as correspondence to reality
Rejection of canonical descriptions and final vocabularies
Suspicion of metanarratives
The list is taken from Bernd Magnus’ (1989) discussion of Nietzsche in relation to postmodern criticism. To Magnus’ list it is relevant to add what Rorty calls “antirepresentationalism” and also to add, alongside “suspicion of metanarratives”, the turn to narrative and narratology, more generally – petite récits pitted against metanarratives by Lyotard (1984) who significantly makes central use of Wittgenstein in a creative misappropriation to emphasize the conflictual or dissensual nature of language games. We might add an emphasis on linguistic use and therapeutic view of philosophy – that is, an embodiment of many of the features of the list above and an ethos, above all, concerning philosophy as a critique of language summed up best in the famous quotation from the Investigations: “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” (#109). This is a view that underlies the development of social sciences and cultural studies in the latter half of the twentieth century, perhaps, sloganized in the twin methodological imperatives, the linguistic turn, the significance of representation, and the turn to social practices, on the one hand, and the attempt to overcome the dualistic thought, the search for certainty and essences, and the subjectivism that are the legacies of the Cartesian thought, on the other hand. Encouraged by Wittgenstein’s expert disassembly of the Cartesian world view and model of subjectivity, we might entertain a model of education as openness, engagement, and copoiesis, one that is more suited to the global, networked, and digital environment we live in.
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